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LABOR LAW-INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT-RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF STATUTES-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
1978 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are to
be applied prospectively because retrospective application would result
in manifest injustice.
Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980).
In 1959, the American Can Company initiated the Retirement Plan
for Salaried Employees (Plan) which provided retirement benefits for
full time salaried employees who voluntarily joined.1 The Plan
established normal and early retirement dates and allowed either the
employer or the covered employee to elect which date would apply to
the employee.' In 1975 and 1976, the American Can Company elected
to retire four workers under the Plan's early retirement date provi-
sion. The retired workers filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey3 alleging that American Can had
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).'
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that sec-
tion 623(f)(2) of the ADEA permits employers to involuntarily retire
employees if the employer's pension plan is bona fide.' Without
discussing the defendant's plan in detail and without making findings
of fact, the district court held that the involuntary retirements were
pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan and granted summary judg-
ment for American Can on this issue.'
1. Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1118 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. Id. Employees who were covered by a collective bargaining agreement were ex-
cepted from coverage. Id. Under the normal retirement date provision, a member was
eligible for benefits on the first day of the calendar month following his 65th birthday.
The early retirement date provision provided that a member could begin receiving
benefits on the first day of any calendar month within the 10 years preceding his normal
retirement date. The Plan also established a deferred retirement date provision which
permitted an employee to work beyond the normal retirement age of 65. The employee
could begin to collect benefits on the day of actual retirement. Brief for Appellant at 1-2.
3. See Sikora v. American Can Co., No. 76-2431 (D.N.J. March 20, 1978).
4. 622 F.2d at 1118. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III
1979). Plaintiffs further alleged that the Plan was a subterfuge and not bona fide and that
American Can violated the ADEA by intentionally withholding merit and other raises on
the basis of age. 622 F.2d at 1118-19. See also notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text infra.
5. 622 F.2d at 1119. Section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA defines a bona fide pension plan
as one which is not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)
(1976) (amended 1978). The plaintiffs in Sikora contended that American Can's plan was a
subterfuge because the retirement age was low and the pension benefits were inadequate.
622 F.2d at 1124.
6. 622 F.2d at 1119. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
352 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 19:351
The plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit because the district court's order was
not a final judgment and, therefore, the court of appeals did not have
jurisdiction.7 Pursuant to both parties' request, the district court
directed a partial judgment for the defendant on the issue of unlawful
retirement. The employees filed a second appeal in 1978, but on the
day the second appeal was filed, Congress amended the ADEA.9 The
original Act permitted involuntary retirement under a bona fide retire-
ment plan; the 1978 amendments specifically prohibited involuntary
retirement based solely on age, regardless of the type of benefit pro-
gram." The plaintiffs argued that the 1978 amendments were
dispositive of their claim and that the defendant's retirement plan
violated the age discrimination prohibition because the plan allowed
the employer to retire an employee before the age of sixty-five solely
because of age.1 The issue before the three-judge Third Circuit panel
was whether the 1978 amendments should be applied retroactively,
thereby invalidating the plaintiffs' forced retirements.,2
Writing for the majority, 3 Judge Weis pointed out that the
historical bias" against retroactive application of legislation has been
denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978). The Zinger court held that section 623(f)(2) of the 1976 Act
allows involuntary retirement pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan, that is, a plan
which is not a subterfuge but rather requires or permits retirement of an employee at age
60 at the option of the employer. 549 F.2d at 910. See 622 F.2d at 1119.
The district court refused to grant the defendant summary judgment on the plain-
tiffs' claim of discriminatory withholding of raises because the section 623(f)(2) exemption
of bona fide retirement plans does not cover this claim. The court had not decided this
issue at the time of this appeal. Id. See Sikora v. American Can Co., No. 76-2431 slip op.
at 26 (D.N.J. March 20, 1978).
7. 622 F.2d at 1119 n.3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and note 6 supra.
8. 622 F.2d at 1119 n.3. One employee's claims were settled after the second appeal
was taken. The claims of a second employee were dismissed by stipulation. Id. at 1118 n.1.
9. Id. at 1119. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. II 1978)).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
11. 622 F.2d at 1119. In an amicus brief, the Secretary of Labor supported the plain-
tiffs' contention that the defendant's plan violated the ADEA as amended. See Brief for
the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 2-3. However, the Equal Employment Ad-
visory Council filed an amicus brief in support of American Can's contention that the
amendments did not apply to retirements occurring before their enactment. See Brief for
the Equal Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae at 6-7.
12. 622 F.2d at 1118. Prospective application of the amendments would validate the
plaintiffs' retirements if, on remand, the district court found the pension plan to be bona
fide and not a subterfuge under section 623(f)(2).
13. Judge Rosenn joined Judge Weis in the majority opinion. Judge Adams
dissented.
14. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936).
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significantly limited. 5 One form of retroactivity which has been al-
lowed is the immediate application of substantive legislation to pend-
ing cases. 6 The United States Supreme Court in United States v. The
Schooner Peggy expressed the general rule that an amended law must
be applied to a case in which an appeal is pending at the time the
amendment takes effect.17 Judge Weis distinguished The Schooner
Peggy from Sikora in that The Schooner Peggy dealt with an issue of
national concern,18 not with substantive rights previously established
by private parties. 9 He also noted that, according to the Supreme
Court in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond," the rule of The
Schooner Peggy is subject to exception when there is statutory direc-
tion or legislative history to the contrary or when its application would
result in manifest injustice."
To determine whether the Bradley exception applied to Sikora,
Judge Weis first examined the language of the 1978 amendments' for
an intent of prospective or retroactive application.' Finding no clear
congressional directive in the amendments' language,u he reviewed the
15. 622 F.2d at 1119. See Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934);
Grummitt v. Sturgeon Bay Winter Sports Club, 354 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1965).
16. 622 F.2d at 1120.
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801). The Peggy was a French vessel that was cap-
tured by a United States war vessel and condemned. After the case was taken to the
Supreme Court by writ of error, the United States and France ratified a treaty which
mutually restored all property not definitively condemned. The United States Supreme
Court ruled that if the governing law changes subsequent to a judgment but prior to an
appeal, the new law must be obeyed. Id.
18. See id. The national concern in The Schooner Peggy was the ill effect on the rela-
tionship between the United States and France if a treaty between the two countries was
not applied to pending cases. 622 F.2d at 1122.
19. 622 F.2d at 1120.
20. 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). In Bradley the district court awarded to the plaintiffs at-
torneys' fees in their desegregation suit against the Richmond school board. After the
case was appealed, but before the court of appeals rendered a decision, Congress author-
ized federal courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees. The court of appeals reversed the
district court's decision because it maintained that Congress did not intend the legislation
to be retroactive. Relying on The Schooner Peggy, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and ruled that a court must apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision, unless retroactive application would be contrary to statutory
direction or legislative history or would result in manifest injustice. Id. at 711.
21. 622 F.2d at 1120.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2i (Supp. H 1978). By its terms, this amendment was to take ef-
fect April 6, 1978. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
23. 622 F.2d at 1120.
24. Id. Judge Weis found that the wording could be interpreted to mean that the
amendment invalidates all involuntary retirements based on age or invalidates only in-
voluntary age retirements occurring after the date of enactment. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
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legislative history of the 1978 amendments' and found one adverse
reference to retroactivity in the House and Senate floor debates."
While the amendments were before a conference committee, the
Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. MeMann' reversed the.
court of appeals 8 and held that the ADEA as originally enacted per-
mitted involuntary retirement before the age of sixty-five.' Judge
Weis pointed out that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision,
Congress did not word the effective date of the 1978 amendments to
cover former employees who had been retired before they reached the
age of sixty-five. ° He also found indirect support for congressional in-
tent not to apply the amendments retroactively in the Senate and
House debates31 held after the Supreme Court's reversal in McMann.
25. 622 F.2d at 1120. Judge Weis pointed out that Congress began to examine the
ADEA exception for bona fide retirement plans after two courts of appeals had held that
certain involuntary retirements based solely on age were bona fide. Id. See Zinger v.
Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 910 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978) (forced early
retirement before the age of 65 was pursuant to a bona fide and reasonable retirement
plan and did not violate the ADEA); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 217
(5th Cir. 1974) (plan providing for forced retirement at 60 years of age was bona fide).
26. 622 F.2d at 1120-21. At the close of the debate and after the Senate had voted to
approve measures, Senator Jennings Randolph posed the following question:
Mr. RANDOLPH. I should like to ask the Senator from New Jersey (Mr.
WILLIAMS) whether this bill retroactively covers a forced retirement at, say age
60 or 62 prior to the effective date of this bill where the individual so retired is
eligible for, and actually receives, a pension under a pension plan which has been
qualified with the Internal Revenue Service?
Mr. WILLIAMS. The bill is not retroactive. The question of mandatory retire-
ment prior to the effective date of this bill will be determined by the courts' inter-
pretation of existing law.
123 CONG. REC. 34,325 (1977). Judge Weis viewed this exchange as obviously intended to
create legislative history. 622 F.2d at 1120 n.8.
27. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
28. See McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434
U.S. 192 (1977) (ADEA prohibited mandatory retirement based solely on age). The con-
gressional committees considering the amendments approved of this court of appeals deci-
sion. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
AND AD. NEWS 504, 513. Senator Williams' remarks referring to the "courts' interpretation
of existing law" must be understood in light of this court of appeals decision. 622 F.2d at
1120 n.8. See note 26 supra.
29. 622 F.2d at 1121.
30. Id. Judge Weis noted that the conference committee adopted a Senate provision
that delayed the impact of amended section 623(f)(2) on collective bargaining agreements
that permitted retirement of persons over 65 and under 70 at the option of the employer,
until the agreement's expiration date or January 1, 1980, whichever occurred first. He
concluded that the net effect of this action was to delay the implementation of the
substantive amendments. Id.
31. 622 F.2d 1121. During the Senate debate on the conference report, Senator
Williams stated that the conference agreement insures that required mandatory retire-
Vol. 19:351
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Thus, Judge Weis concluded that, to the extent that it is relevant, the
legislative history tends to support the conclusion that Congress did
not intend retroactive application of the amendment.2
Judge Weis pointed out that neither congressional disagreement
with the Supreme Court's holding in McMann nor the repeated
references in the amendments' legislative history of Congress' intent
to clarify the meaning of section 623(f)(2) compels the conclusion that
Congress intended to legislate retroactively.' References in the
legislative history demonstrating congressional intent to overcome a
Supreme Court decision do not determine whether Congress also in-
tended to affect events that had occurred before the enactment date.'
Judge Weis added that when confronted with the applicability of the
amendments to section 623(f)(2) all the district courts except one have
applied them prospectively. 5
The court next addressed whether retroactive application of the
amendments would result in manifest injustice. Under Bradley, the
evaluation of manifest injustice requires an examination of the iden-
tities of the parties, the nature of their rights, and the impact that the
changed law has on those rights. The court categorized the Sikora
plaintiffs as private parties involved in a private dispute and
distinguished Sikora from Bradley because the dispute in Bradley in-
volved the action of a school board which is a public body supported by
taxes.' The court observed that the employees had voluntarily joined
the plan under a contract which was prima facie in compliance with the
law when the retirements occurred. 9 Judge Weis concluded that at the
ment in pension plans "may no longer be applied to employees covered by this act." 124
CONG. REC. S4449 (daily ed. March 23, 1978). On the House floor, Representative Hawkins,
while referring to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in McMann, stated that
"such a plan no longer falls within the § 4(f)(2) exception." 124 CONG. REc. H2270 (daily ed.
March 21, 1978).
32. 622 F.2d at 1121.
33. Id.
34. Id. See United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
35. 622 F.2d at 1121-22.
36. Id. at 1122.
37. Id. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. at 717.
38. 622 F.2d at 1122. See 416 U.S. at 718. The court also distinguished Sikora from
The Schooner Peggy in that the The Schooner Peggy involved the interpretation of a na-
tional treaty which could create international repercussions. 622 F.2d at 1122.
39. 622 F.2d at 1122. In 1969, the Secretary of Labor issued an interpretative bulletin
which stated that the ADEA authorized involuntary retirement pursuant to a bona fide
pension plan. Id. In 1975, the new Secretary of Labor changed the Labor Department's
position and stated that the ADEA did not authorize involuntary retirement based on
age. Id. at 1123 n.11. Judge Weis noted, however, that the new position has not survived
the judicial scrutiny of Taft Broadcasting, 500 F.2d at 213, and Zinger, 549 F.2d at 908,
which interpreted the ADEA to authorize involuntary retirement pursuant to a bona fide
1981
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time of their retirements the plaintiffs had no firmly established right
to continue in employment and the defendants had a contractual option
to retire its employees." The court noted that where the rights of the
parties are fixed, post-Bradley cases have declined to apply new law to
pending cases."
Finally, the court discussed the impact of a retroactive application
on the solvency of a pension plan.' Judge Weis recognized the special
consideration that the Supreme Court has given to rulings that affect
pension plans and noted that drastic changes in the rules governing
such plans can jeopardize their solvency.' The court concluded that
the potential adverse effect that a retroactive application of the
amendments would have on American Can's pension plan is partic-
ularly pertinent in light of the Bradley directive to consider the nature
of the rights being litigated and the impact the changed law would
have on these rights."
Because of the legislative history and the need to prevent manifest
injustice, the court concluded that the presumption of retroactivity ar-
ticulated in Bradley did not apply in this case. Accordingly, the court
held that the 1978 amendments do not apply to early retirements that
occurred before the effective date of the legislation. 5
The court did not make any findings as to the plaintiffs' allegations
that American Can's pension plan was not bona fide and a subterfuge.
It noted that the district court record did not reveal the factual basis
pension plan. Thus, when the plaintiffs in Sikora were retired in 1975, there existed an in-
terpretative bulletin and case law which sustained American Can's position that the
ADEA permitted involuntary retirement before the age of 65. 622 F.2d at 1123.
40. 622 F.2d at 1123.
41. Id. See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v.
Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141 (1944); Hospital Employees Labor Program v. Ridgeway
Hosp., 570 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1978); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos,
549 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. 622 F.2d at 1123.
43. Id. The court relied heavily on City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). In Manhart, although the Supreme Court found sex-
differentiated employee contribution to a pension fund impermissible, the Court cautioned
that legal rules affecting pension funds should not be applied retroactively unless the
legislature plainly commands that result. Id. at 721.
44. 622 F.2d at 1123.
45. Id. at 1123-24. The plaintiffs also argued that the court in Zinger misinterpreted
the ADEA to authorize involuntary retirement pursuant to a bona fide pension plan, and
urged the court to adopt the position taken by Congress in enacting the amendments.
Judge Weis rejected this argument and stated that legislative observations made by Con-
gress after the original act was passed are not part of theAct's legislative history and




for its conclusion that the plan was bona fide.' The court concluded
that because the case had to be returned to the district court for a
resolution of the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in denying merit
raises, the district court should allow plaintiffs to develop further their
claim that the plan is in fact a subterfuge and not bona fide.' 7
Judge Adams, writing in dissent, agreed with the majority that the
language and history of the amendments are ambiguous and do not
provide a sufficiently clear indication of congressional intent.'8 He
disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that retroactive ap-
plication of the amendments would be manifestly unjust to the defend-
ant company and concluded that retroactive application was required
to afford plaintiffs the protection of the amendment.'
Judge Adams reviewed the history of retroactive application of
law,' concluding that Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham" and
Bradley represent a dramatic shift in the law of retroactivity. 2 He
maintained that both prior case law and the language of Thorpe and
Bradley support their applicability to cases in which the change in law
creates a new substantive cause of action."
46. 622 F.2d at 1124. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' contention that the Plan
was a subterfuge could not be resolved based on the record. American Can established its
plan in 1959. The Plan was amended on January 1, 1972 and January 1, 1974. Each time,
the method for determining early retirement benefits changed. It was not apparent to the
court that the changes in the Plan were significant. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1125 (Adams, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1125-28 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams stated that the Supreme
Court established early that a statute is presumed to have prospective effect only absent
clear indication to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 339
(1806); Caulder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). He added that this concept of presumed
retroactivity has been paralleled by the seemingly contradictory rule of retroactive ap-
plication of law changed during the pendency of an appeal by a reviewing court. See
United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801). He concluded
that, with the Supreme Court holdings in Thorpe and Bradley, the Court has adopted the
rule of presumed retroactivity and incorporated presumed prospectivity into the manifest
injustice exception to the retroactive rule. 622 F.2d at 1127-28 (Adams, J., dissenting).
51. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). In Thorpe after the eviction order of a tenant in a federally
funded housing project had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina and
the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ordered new procedural requisites for an eviction. The Court held an
appellate court must apply the law at the time it renders a decision and therefore the ten-
ant should receive the protections of the HUD circular. Id. at 281-83.
52. -622 F.2d at 1128 (Adams, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1129 (Adams, J., dissenting). Several courts have refused to follow Thorpe
and Bradley where the change in law created a new cause of action or affected substan-
tive rights. See, e.g., Jones v. City of San Antonio, 568 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (5th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam); Faulkner v. Federation of Preschool and Community Educ. Centers, Inc., 564
1981
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Because Congress did not exhibit an intent to limit the amendment
to prospective applicability sufficient to overcome the Supreme Court's
opposite presumption, Judge Adams turned to an examination of
whether it would be manifestly unjust to apply the amendment to the
present case. 4 Utilizing the criteria set forth in Bradley, Judge Adams
first identified and characterized the plaintiffs 5 He maintained that to
distinguish between cases involving private parties and those involv-
ing a private party and a tax-supported entity would be contrary to
the language of Thorpe and Bradley and would invert a general rule
into a limited rule applicable to only a small number of cases. Judge
Adams asserted that the critical question is whether private litigation
involves a matter of great national concern.57 He pointed out that the
legislative history of the 1978 amendments indicates that Congress
viewed age discrimination in the mandatory retirement of the older
workers as a matter of profound national importance." Judge Adams
concluded that this case is not merely a private dispute betweeen in-
dividuals, but rather a case that involves age discrimination in employ-
ment, which is a matter of great national concern.55
In examining the second Bradley criteria, Judge Adams maintained
that the rights and obligations of the contracting parties had not
F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d
259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Cohen v. Illinois
Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976);
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d at 410-11. Judge Adams maintained that such a refusal
to follow Thorpe and Bradley would be at variance with the broad general rule of presumed
retroactivity. He stated that United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) (per curiam),
supports the conclusion that Thorpe and Bradley also apply when the change in law
creates a new substantive cause of action. 622 F.2d at 1129. In United States v. Alabama
the federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the state of Alabama violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 (1957) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1976) by denying them the right to vote on the grounds that the Act did
not authorize such a suit. While appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, Congress
amended the Civil Rights Act and created such a cause of action. The Court held that the
amendment applied to the case and remanded the case to federal district court for trial.
362 U.S. at 604.
54. 622 F.2d at 1129 (Adams, J., dissenting).
55. Id. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. at 717.
56. 622 F.2d at 1130 (Adams, J., dissenting). See 416 U.S. at 711; Thorpe v. Housing
Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. at 281.
57. 622 F.2d at 1130 (Adams, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1130-31 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams cited the Senate Report by
the Committee of Human Resources to illustrate that Congress was very concerned with
the relationship between activity and good health and that job discrimination in man-
datory retirement of the elderly was a problem of serious national concern. Id. at 1131
(Adams, J., dissenting). See S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 505-07.
59. 622 F.2d at 1131 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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matured at the time of the involuntary retirements. Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held that in-
voluntary retirement under a bona fide pension plan is permitted
under the Act," there existed no definitive ruling on the issue in the
circuit in which the retirements took place." Thus, according to Judge
Adams, the defendants did not have unconditionally established rights
under the Act.2 Judge Adams also rejected the majority's argument
that American Can's rights became unconditional as a result of a 1969
interpretive bulletin issued by the Secretary of Labor. The defendants
did not plead good faith reliance on the bulletin. Because section 626(e)
of the Act requires that good faith reliance be affirmatively pleaded, 3
Judge Adams maintained that the company cannot be said to have
proved reliance." Therefore, Judge Adams found that neither the case
law interpretation of the ADEA nor the good faith defense of the Act
would manifest injustice.65
Judge Adams then turned to the third Bradley criteria which asks
whether retroactive application of the amendment will impose new and
unanticipated obligations upon a party without notice or opportunity to
be heard.6 According to Judge Adams, at the time that the plaintiffs
were retired the state of the law suggested that the Act was
reasonably open to varying constructions" and the federal court inter-
pretations of the Act were ambiguous and uncertain. 8 Thus, Judge
60. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. 622 F.2d at 1132 (Adams, J., dissenting).
62. Id. Judge Adams maintained that because Taft Broadcasting was a Fifth Circuit
decision, it neither directly affected the defendant company nor established law that was
binding on it. Id.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976).
64. 622 F.2d-at 1132 (Adams, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. at 720.
67. 622 F.2d at 1133. Judge Adams distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in
Bradley in that the common law awarding of attorneys' fees was sufficiently settled that
the applicability of an attorneys' fees statute to pending litigation was not unforeseeable.
Id. See 416 U.S. at 721. In contrast, in Sikora there is no binding legal authority over
American Can's operations in New Jersey. In addition, the change in the Secretary of
Labor's position put American Can on notice that the Secretary would view such retire-
ment as illegal. 622 F.2d at 1133-34 (Adams, J., dissenting). See Brief for the Secretary of
Labor as Amicus Curiae at 26.
68. 622 F.2d at 1134 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judicial interpretation of the Act did not
offer clear guidance. Taft Broadcasting was a two-to-one decision in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which held that a plan providing for forced retire-
ment at 60 years of age was bona fide. 500 F.2d at 217. Other circuits were divided as to
the application of the Act. The Third Circuit held in Zinger that the Act allowed involun-
tary retirement. 549 F.2d at 910. The Fourth Circuit in McMann held that it did not. 542
F.2d at 217. Although the Supreme Court reversed the McMann decision, Judge Adams
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Adams concluded that the change in law brought about by the 1978
amendments was not unforeseeable, and application of the amendment
to this case would not be manifestly unjust to American Can. 9
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was enacted in 1967 to
correct the misconception that a person's age detrimentally affects job
performance and to promote employment based on ability." As
originally enacted, the Act exempted bona fide benefit plans.7' As in-
terpreted by the Department of Labor72 and the courts, 3 the exemp-
tion allowed early retirement based on age if pursuant to a pension
plan which was not a subterfuge created to avoid the purpose of the
Act.7"' The 1978 amendments effectively resolved the question of
whether a bona fide pension plan allows an employer to utilize an
employee's age as a basis for retirement by specifically stating that no
pension plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of an
employee based solely on age.75 The question of whether the amend-
believed that at the time of the appellants' retirements, the law was unclear and it could
not be said that the change in section 623(f)(2) by the 1978 amendments was unforeseeable
by American Can. 622 F.2d at 1134 (Adams, J., dissenting).
69. 622 F.2d at 1134 (Adams, J., dissenting). See note 62 and accompanying text
supra. Judge Adams further reasoned that because the ADEA statute of limitations and
tolling period are short, very few persons involuntarily retired before the 1978 amend-
ments would have a cause of action and therefore any potential financial burden on
American Can's pension plan would be minimal. 622 F.2d at 1134 n.80 (Adams, J., dissent-
ing). See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. II 1978) (charges must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged violation); id. § 626(eX2) (one year statute of limitations).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976). The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715, 42 U.S.C. § 2000
e-14 (1976), established the groundwork for the ADEA by instructing the Secretary of
Labor to conduct a study on the relationship between age and employment. The study
revealed the extent of the practice of age retirement based on the assumption that age
has detrimental effects on ability. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 (1965) at 6-8, summarized in Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HAiy. L. REV. 380, 383 (1976).
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976).
72. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1976). This Department of Labor interpretation stated
that the Act authorizes involuntary retirement irrespective of age if pursuant to the
terms of a bona fide retirement plan. Id. The language of this section remained unchanged
in the 1979 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations notwithstanding an intervening
change in position by the Secretary of Labor. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1979). See note 39
and accompanying text supra.
73. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. at 201-02; Zinger v. Blanchette,
549 F.2d at 910; Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d at 217.
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976). The purpose of the Act was to promote employ-
ment of older workers and to prohibit age discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976). See
also Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d at 217 (defines bona fide employee benefit
plan as one which is both authentic and genuine in that it truly exists and employees are
paid benefits as a result of it).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978). See 622 F.2d at 1119.
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ments should apply retroactively to invalidate forced retirements oc-
curring before the date of enactment remained. '
In 1801, the United States Supreme Court in The Schooner Peggy
established that if the relevant law is changed during the time an ap-
peal is pending, the court is bound to apply the new law." In 1806,
however, the Supreme Court established that statutes should have pro-
spective effect unless a clear and strong contrary intent appeared from
an examination of the statutory language or the legislative history.
8
The Court reasoned that injustice would result if a person were held
legally responsible for duties or obligations created after his trans-
adtions.19 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions applied these rules dif-
ferently. Some cases held that new statutes should apply to cases
pending on appeal only where the terms of the law state it should ap-
ply,80 while others ruled that the new law must be given effect unless
there is a clear indication that it should not apply to pending cases.
These inconsistencies were ultimately resolved by the Supreme
Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham82 which adopted a
broad reading of the presumed retroactivity rule. The Court held that
a court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,
76. 622 F.2d at 1119. Although Sikora involves the retroactive application of an
amendment to a pending case in which the disputed action occurred before the enactment
of the amendment, the court addressed the general issue of whether this statute should
be applied retroactively to all retirements occurring before enactment of the amendments.
Id. at 1118, 1123-24.
77. 5 U.S. at 110. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
78. United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 409 (1806).
79. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913). This
rule of statutory construction that a law is presumed to be prospective continued through
the mid-1960's. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964); Claridge Apart-
ments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141 (1944).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604 (1960) (per curiam) (Court
applied newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1960 to pending case because it expressly
authorized action against a state); Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23, 26 (1940) (amend-
ment to the Bankruptcy Act expressly stated that its provisions were to apply to pending
cases); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 477-78 (1899) (terms of the Indian Ap-
propriation Act of July 1, 1898 which allowed for appeals to the Supreme Court, man-
dated retroactivity).
81. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943) (applied an amended
act to a pending permit application stating that a change in the law before an appellate
decision requires the appellate court to apply the new law); Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941) (a federal appellate court must apply state law as
presently interpreted by the state supreme court despite a change in interpretation be-
tween the trial and appellate decisions); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 271, 222-24
(1934) (ratification of the twenty-first amendment made the eighteenth amendment im-
mediately inoperative and thus the federal government could not maintain an action based
upon prior violation of the eighteenth amendment).
82. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). See note 51 supra.
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unless a clear contrary intent appears in the statute's language or
legislative history.83 The Court also noted that exceptions to the
general rule have been made when retroactive application of a law to a
pending case would result in a manifest injustice," but the Court did
not establish any guidelines to define manifest injustice.
Five years later, the Supreme Court in Bradley v. School Board of
Richmond85 reaffirmed the general rule of presumed retroactivity and
its exceptions8 set forth 'in Thorpe. The Bradley Court additionally
established guidelines to define manifest injustice. The Court examined
the concerns of The Schooner Peggy and Thorpe and concluded that
the finding of manifest injustice centers around an examination of the
nature and identity of the parties, the nature of their rights, and the
nature of the impact the changes have on these rights. 7
The Sikora court was faced with applying the teachings of Thorpe
and Bradley to the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. Because the
language of the 1978 amendments is unclear as to whether the statute
should operate in a prospective or retroactive manner" the legislative
history must be examined. In examining the legislative history, the
court must determine whether an intent that the statute be applied
prospectively or retroactively is so obvious that it should be so inter-
preted even though the statute does not expressly direct it. 9 A review
of the legislative history of the 1978 amendments shows that they
83. 393 U.S. at 281-83.
84. Id. at 282. See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964), and note 103 infra.
85. 416 U.S. 696 (1974). See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
86. 416 U.S. at 711.
87. Id. at 717. Bradley can be interpreted as a presumption and set of guidelines to
be applied to all new statutes, both procedural and substantive, or it can be interpreted
as applying only to procedural changes in law, that is, law creating a new remedy for an
existing cause of action. 622 F.2d at 1128-29. Most courts have not discussed whether the
right is procedural or substantive when applying the principles of Bradley. See Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77 (1975); Yakim v. Califano, 587 F.2d 149, 150 (3d Cir. 1978). See also
622 F.2d at 1128-29. But see Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 8849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court in Atlantic Container Line distinguished Bradley
because Bradley dealt with procedural remedies and Atlantic Container Line dealt with
the substantive rights afforded by the ADEA. Id. 8849, at 5507.
88. See note 24 supra.
89. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (objective is to ascertain con-
gressional intent and give effect to legislative will); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335
U.S. 377, 386 (1948) (meaning of legislation should be determined by consideration of the
words, the purpose of the law, and the circumstances); Lippi v. Thomas, 298 F. Supp. 242,
247 (M.D. Pa. 1969) (function of the courts is to construe language so as to give effect to
the intent of Congress). In some instances, the courts have examined the legislative
history even where the statutory language is clear. See, e.g., Hunt v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 611 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 906 (1980) (reference to
legislative history is proper no matter how clear the statutory language appears to be).
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were enacted after the Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann,' which stated that the bona fide pension plan exemp-
tion allowed involuntary retirements based on age." While portions of
the congressional records expressly disapprove of the McMann deci-
sion and state that the amendments will correct the Supreme Court's
misinterpretation of the ADEA, 2 other section are in accordance with
a view of nonretroactivity 3 Thus, the legislative history does not give
a clear indication of congressional intent."
If examination of the statutory language and legislative history of
the amendments provides no clear direction, the court must examine
the parties, their rights, and the effect of the new law on their rights
to determine if retroactive application will cause manifest injustice.
To understand how the nature of the parties affects a determination of
manifest injustice the court must look to the language of The Schooner
90. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
91. Id. at 203. In deciding McMann, the Supreme Court was aware of Congress' plans
to amend the Act but the Court stated that it had to limit its review to the legislative
history and statutory language of the original Act and not the legislative observations
made ten years after the passage of the Act. Id. at 199-200 & n.7. This view is in accord
with other decisions. See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269
(1965) (it is hazardous to use the views of a subsequent Congress to infer the views of an
earlier one); Marshall v. Delaware River and Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 890 (D. Del.
1979) (court stated that whatever views the 95th Congress had regarding the original in-
tent behind the ADEA, Congress' policy decision to "clarify" the Act through the 1978
amendments does not automatically infer their intent for retroactive application).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. AND AD. NEWS 528, 529; 124 CONG. REC. S4450 (daily ed., March 23, 1978) (Senator
Javits' statement that McMann misinterpreted the ADEA in holding that involuntary
retirement based on age is authorized by section 623(f)(2)).
93. See 123 CONG. REC. S17,304 (daily ed., Oct. 19, 1977) (Senator Williams' Commit-
tee statement that the amendments were not to be retroactive); 124 CONG. REC. H2276
(daily ed., March 21, 1978) (the amendments apply only to those currently employed and
subject to existing pension plans that require retirement before the age of 65).
94. In the cases since Bradley that have dealt with the 1978 amendments, the courts
have held that there was still not sufficient legislative directive to conclude that the
amendments should be applied retroactively to the pending cases. See Marshall v.
Delaware River and Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1979); Marshall v. Atlantic Con-
tainer Line, 470 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Marshall v. Baltimore and O.R.R., 461 F.
Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978). These cases hold that the legislative history of the 1978 amend-
ments, coupled with knowledge of the purpose of the Act, does not provide an adequate
basis upon which the decision as to prospective or retroactive application could be reached.
These holdings did not expressly say what is required to show clear congressional direc-
tion. Thus, the question arises as to how much direction is needed before the courts will
conclude that the legislative history favors either retroactive or prospective operations. It
appears that the courts are requiring a detailed, express reference in the legislative
history to the application of an amendment before the court will conclude that congres-
sional intent is clear.
95. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. at 715.
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Peggy." The Supreme Court in The Schooner Peggy stated that if the
action is merely between two private individuals, the court should
struggle hard against a retroactive operation that will affect the rights
of the parties, but in the instance of great national concern, the court
must apply the new law. Thus, the Court in The Schooner Peggy an-
chored its retroactive application of the treaty on a finding that the in-
volved treaty entailed a situation of great national concern, where in-
dividual rights are sacrificed for national purposes. 7 In examining the
effect of the nature of the parties on whether the new legislation
should apply to the pending case, the Bradley Court looked to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the passage of the new act, including Con-
gress' concern and intent in enacting the statute. 8 The Court con-
cluded that all these factors proclaimed the issue of desegregation to
be of great national concern.9
The facts confronting the court in Sikora fall somewhere between
the facts of The Schooner Peggy and Bradley. The parties in Sikora
are both private and, therefore, the case appears to fall within the
private individual language of The Schooner Peggy which favors pro-
spective application.'" At the same time, however, the issue of age
discrimination, like desegregation, appears to be one of great national
concern which, according to Bradley, suggests retroactive applica-
tion.'' When public entities are parties to an action there is a greater
likelihood of great national concern, but an action between private in-
dividuals does not necessarily preclude the conclusion that the subject
matter is of great national concern. The Sikora majority failed to
96. The Bradley Court drew on Chief Justice Marshall's distinction in The Schooner
Peggy between private cases and issues of great national concern in discussing the effect
of the nature of the parties. 416 U.S. at 717-19. See 5 U.S. at 110.
97. 5 U.S. at 110. In quoting The Schooner Peggy, the Supreme Court has commonly
edited its language. The pertinent language in full states:
It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to
struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect
the rights of parties, but in great national concerns, where individual rights, ac-
quired by war, are sacrified for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice
ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the
nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for
the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. In such
a case the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to
set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in
violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.
Id.
98. 416 U.S. at 719. See note 20 supra.
99. 416 U.S. at 719.
100. 5 U.S. at 110.
101. See 416 U.S. at 719.
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recognize that there can be private litigation of great national concern.
Instead, the court distinguished the Sikora facts from the repercus-
sions of an international treaty in The Schooner Peggy and constitu-
tional violations by a public body in Bradley, and held that the case fell
within the private party language of Bradley and The Schooner
Peggy.
102
The Bradley Court's definition of manifest injustice requires an ex-
amination of two additional criteria. The second aspect of the analysis
is an examination of the nature of the rights affected by the change in
law. The focal question is whether the rights of the parties had
matured or become unconditional before the change in the law."3 The
Supreme Court has declined to apply new laws to pending cases when
it has concluded that to do so would adversely affect rights that had
matured."' The plaintiffs and defendant voluntarily contracted to allow
the defendant company to retire employees against their will at an early
age, and to allow the plaintiffs to choose early retirement benefits
against the defendant's wishes. American Can exercised its option in
conformance with the contract, and in a manner consistent with the
law at the time that the plaintiffs were involuntarily retired. 0 ' The
102. 622 F.2d at 1122.
103. 416 U.S. at 720.
104. See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie
Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190 (1913). In Greene an aeronautical engineer claimed that the
federal government wrongfully revoked his security pass. When the Supreme Court later
ruled in Greene's favor and directed the lower court to expunge all rulings denying
Greene's security clearance, he sued the Department of Defense claiming that a 1955
regulation allowed an employee to sue for lost earnings after a final determination
favorable to the employee. The Defense Department argued that the Court should apply
new department regulations that were issued after the suit for compensation was in-
itiated but before the Court had ruled. The Court held that Greene's right to recover
matured as a result of the Court's earlier ruling in his favor. 376 U.S. at 160-61.
In Union Pacific, an act of Congress granted the railroad a right of way in public lands.
Laramie claimed ownership of certain portions of this land based on adverse possession.
The court held that a later act, which would sustain Laramie's claim, would not operate
retroactively because it would deprive the railroad of its vested rights in the land. Id. at
197.
See also Hospital Employees Labor Program v. Ridgeway Hosp., 570 F.2d 167 (7th Cir.
1978) (where the union and hospital had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
and the hospital refused to submit to arbitration to resolve a grievance, the union's claim
matured at the time of refusal).
105. 622 F.2d at 1123. At the time of the plaintiffs' retirements, the interpretative
bulletin stated that the Act permitted involuntary early retirement. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a)
(1976). See note 71 supra. Where, as in Sikora, federal law is involved, the courts give
considerable weight to administrative agencies' statutory interpretations. See, e.g.,
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Thorpe v.
Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. at 276; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964); Dow
Chem. Co. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 1979); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA,
1981
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company had the right to rely lon its contract which was consistent
with the only available authority at that time.1 6 These mature contract
rights are in contrast to the school board's rights in Bradley that had
not matured because the involved tax funds were held in trust for the
taxpayers subject to the expression of their wishes through their
elected officials.0 7
Finally, Bradley requires an examination of the impact of the new
law on existing rights. The criteria appears to be drawn chiefly from
Thorpe. The Supreme Court in Thorpe stated that the legislature can
control the proceedings and forms to enforce a contract only as long as
it does not seriously impair the value of the contract right."8 In
Bradley the Court concluded that the new law would not affect the
substantive obligations of the parties and there was no increased
burden because the new law did not change the Board's responsibility
to provide students with a non-discriminatory education.", In contrast,
an application of the 1978 amendments to retirements occurring in
1975 and 1976 would deprive American Can of its contractual right and
would give the plaintiffs a right that was neither mutually agreed
upon nor expected by the contracting parties. Because a later retire-
ment would require American Can to pay plaintiffs a salary plus a
larger pension upon retirement, the financial liabilities of the Plan
would be changed contrary to American Can's expectations. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that changes in legal rules governing
pensions and other benefit plans can dramatically affect their financial
stability."' Additionally, certainty in the law is necessary to facilitate
long term business planning."' Unless an employer can safely conclude
that the law will be applied as currently interpreted by the courts and
526 F.2d 1027, 1041 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); Budd Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 513 F.2d 201, 203-05 (3d Cir. 1975); Hart v.
United Steelworkers, 350 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Pa. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 482
F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1973) (interpretation of the ADEA by the Secretary of Labor should be
given great weight). Although at the time of the parties' agreement, neither the Third
Circuit nor the Supreme Court had interpreted the ADEA, the single court that had ad-
dressed the involuntary retirement provision had held that such actions were authorized.
See Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. See Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, Inc., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8849 at 5507.
107. 416 U.S. at 720.
108. 393 U.S. at 280.
109. 416 U.S. at 721.
110. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart. 435 U.S. 702, 721-22
(1978).
111. See Brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 18, Sikora v. American
Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
107-08 (1971) (businesses should be able to conduct their activities according to rights and
expectations as presently defined).
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enforcing agencies, the stability of employment relations will be
severely undermined. 11
2
Because in Bradley none of the factors supported a finding of
manifest injustice, it is unclear how the factors should be balanced
when the impact on the parties' rights will be unjust, yet the issue is
of great national concern. The language of The Schooner Peggy
declares that in instances of great national concern the court must
decide according to existing laws; however Bradley enumerates two
other factors which may negate retroactive application due to manifest
injustice. In Sikora, although involuntary retirement and age
discrimination are arguably matters of great national concern, the un-
just impact on the parties' contractual rights supports a finding that
retroactive application of the amendments would be manifestly unjust.
Andrew C. Siminerio
112. See Brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 28, Sikora v. American
Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Marshall v. Baltimore and O.R.R., 461 F.
Supp. at 383.
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